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Abstract  
We develop the first spatially integrated economic-hydrological model of the western Lake Erie 
basin explicitly linking economic models of farmers' field-level Best Management Practice 
(BMP) adoption choices with the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) model to evaluate 
nutrient management policy cost-effectiveness. We quantify tradeoffs among phosphorus 
reduction policies and find that a hybrid policy coupling a fertilizer tax with cost-share payments 
for subsurface placement is the most cost-effective, and when implemented with a 200% tax can 
achieve the stated policy goal of 40% reduction in nutrient loadings. We also find economic 
adoption models alone can overstate the potential for BMPs to reduce nutrient loadings by 
ignoring biophysical complexities.   
 
Key Words: Integrated assessment model; agricultural land watershed model; water quality; 
cost-share; conservation practice; nutrient management 
JEL Codes: H23, Q51, Q52, Q53 
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1. Introduction 
Agricultural nutrient runoff, especially phosphorus (P), from the Maumee River watershed in the 
western Lake Erie basin has led to frequent and severe water quality crises, including harmful 
algal blooms (HABs) and hypoxia in Lake Erie and the 2014 Toledo water crisis (Lake Erie 
LaMP 2011; Scavia et al. 2014; Stumpf et al. 2012). To address these growing concerns, the 
United States and Canada adopted a revised version of the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement (GLWQA) in 2012, which aims to reduce total phosphorus (TP) and dissolved 
reactive phosphorus (DRP) entering affected areas of Lake Erie by 40% relative to the 2008 
loading levels (Binational.net 2012). At the national level, spending on federally funded 
conservation programs is projected to be over $5.5 billion annually, or about $15 per acre per 
year, during the five-year life of the 2014 Farm Bill. At the state level, Ohio’s Senate Bill 1, 
signed in early 2015, requires nutrient management plans for all producers, prohibits manure or 
fertilizer application on frozen grounds and 24 hours before a forecasted storm, and encourages 
injecting or incorporating fertilizer or manure application into the ground. Despite these efforts, 
the 2015 Lake Erie HAB was even larger and more severe than the HAB recorded in 2011 
(Stumpf et al. 2016) and the issue continues to be at the forefront of environmental and 
agricultural policy issues for the Great Lakes region.  
A key feature of federal and state programs is that they are often voluntary, with 
producers opting to participate receiving a cost-share payment covering part or all of the best 
management effort. Despite their prevalence, there is a significant lack of empirical evidence of 
the cost-effectiveness of these cost-share programs in terms of their downstream impacts 
(Garnache et al. 2016). While these incentives have effectively encouraged farmer adoption of 
best management practices (BMPs), it is unknown if they are economically cost-efficient, which 
   
 
4 
would greatly depend on the extent to which these land management changes are successful in 
reducing nutrient loadings and improving water quality benefits.  
This article fills a critical policy evaluation gap by developing a spatially integrated 
economic-hydrological model that explicitly links individual land management decisions by 
heterogeneous farmers on heterogeneous fields with a hydrological process model to evaluate the 
cost-effectiveness of various nutrient management policies. Specifically, we link farmer-survey-
based economic models of BMP adoption with the widely used hydrological-process-based Soil 
and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) model. The economic models include an ordered logit 
model that explains how BMP adoption costs and cost-share payment subsidies drive changes in 
adoption behavior, and a fertilizer demand model to analyze and predict farmers’ fertilizer 
application rate decisions under fertilizer taxes. Our SWAT model incorporates BMP decisions, 
geophysical data such as soil type, and climate information as inputs to assess the effectiveness 
of different policy scenarios in reducing nutrient runoff at the watershed scale. With this 
integrated economic-hydrological model, we are able not only to quantify the changes in 
conservation practice adoption on an individual field scale in response to policy incentives, but 
also to simulate the resulting impacts from the watershed on water quality changes, specifically 
TP and DRP loadings.  
We apply this model to the biggest Great Lakes watershed—the Maumee River 
watershed— to quantify the tradeoff between P reduction and policy costs for a range of 
alternative policies and to investigate which of these policies has the potential to reach the policy 
target of a 40% reduction in phosphorus loadings to Lake Erie. The Maumee watershed is the 
largest source of P loadings into Lake Erie and the primary driver of the extent of Lake Erie 
HABs (Maccoux et al. 2016, Scavia et al. 2014). Using a 2014 survey of 2,324 respondents of 
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farmers from this watershed that provides extensive information on farmers’ BMP choices, field 
characteristics, and demographics (Burnett et al. 2015), we examine three salient in-field 
conservation practices—subsurface fertilizer placement (via banding or in-furrow with seed), 
post-fall-harvest cover crops, and P fertilizer application rate reduction—all of which have been 
shown to be critical and promising in reducing nutrient runoff (Wilson et al. 2019; Gildow et al. 
2016; Mahler 2001; Scavia et al. 2014). Our integrated model allows us to assess the cost-
effectiveness of cost-share payments that are currently in place under a range of possible 
payment amounts as well as three hypothetical policies: (a) a fertilizer tax, which ranges in 
magnitude from 0% to 400% of the producer-specific P fertilizer price; (b) a spatially-targeted 
zonal policy that only offers cost-share payments to farmers in the nutrient runoff “hotspot” 
counties; and, (c) a revenue-neutral hybrid policy that administers a fertilizer tax and then 
redistributes those revenues to producers in the form of cost-share payments for adoption of 
subsurface placement or cover crops.   
The main results show that either a substantial increase in fertilizer costs through a tax, or 
a hybrid approach that combines a somewhat lower fertilizer tax with cost-share incentives for 
subsurface placement, can meet this policy target. Specifically, we find that a 400% fertilizer tax 
on the producer-specific P fertilizer price  can generate a 39.5% reduction in TP, while a 200% 
fertilizer tax that is recycled for cost-share payments for subsurface placement can lead to 40.5% 
reduction in TP.i In comparison, a very ambitious cost share program of $80/acre uniformly 
offered to all farmers reduces DRP loadings by 13% and TP loadings by 8% and imposes $188 
million in annual policy costs. In comparison, farmers in Ohio received about $36 million in cost 
share payments from the USDA EQIP program in 2018 (USDA NRCS 2018). Based on the 
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model scenarios and results considered here, this outlay could at best generate less than 5% P 
loading reduction even if used exclusively for incentivizing subsurface placement.  
Another key result of our study is that subsurface placement of fertilizer is a more 
effective BMP than cover crops in terms of reducing P loading. More importantly, looking at the 
cost-share payment programs, despite significantly higher adoption of the targeted BMPs under 
various policy scenarios, the resulting watershed-scale reduction in P loadings at best account for 
less than half of the prescribed 40% nutrient reduction goal. For example, we find that, while the 
$80/acre uniform cost-share payment for farmers to adopt subsurface placement would increase 
the total cropland acres in the watershed from 46% to 65%, the corresponding percent reduction 
in nutrient loadings is much less—13% and 8% in DRP and TP loadings, respectively. Even with 
the spatially targeted payment that targets the runoff “hotspot” counties, which is more cost-
effective than the uniform cost-share payments, we observe a similar reduction at a slightly 
lower total cost. The lack of responsiveness in water quality could be a result of the hydrologic 
and biophysical complexities, including legacy P attached to soils and hydrological routing 
within the watershed. Thus, more innovative policies that provide alternative approaches to 
reduce nutrient runoff are needed.   
By integrating both the economic and biophysical systems in a spatially explicit 
framework that also accounts for individual decision making, this work makes novel 
contributions and extends the literature in multiple ways. A substantial literature examines 
farmers’ adoption of BMPs and the role of monetary incentives (e.g., Blackstock et al. 2010), 
adoption costs (e.g., Sheriff 2005; Kurkalova et al. 2006), and farmers’ socio-economic and 
socio-psychological characteristics (e.g., Norris and Batie 1987; Zhang et al. 2016; Burnett et al. 
2015; Wu et al. 2004). However, these studies focus on individual decision making and most do 
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not explicitly consider downstream water quality impacts and, thus, are unable to fully evaluate 
policy effectiveness. On the other hand, a growing number of hydrological process-based models 
have been developed for Lake Erie and other areas of the Great Lakes region; however, these 
models omit behavioral or economic considerations and therefore must impose assumptions 
about BMP adoption (e.g., assuming full or random adoption, see Scavia et al. 2017 and  Bosch 
et al. 2014). We demonstrate the value and necessity of integrated assessment models to identify 
realistic policy impacts of nutrient management policies and quantify the social cost of water 
quality.  We show that ignoring biophysical complexity, as is typical of most economics models, 
or imposing unrealistic simplified adoption behavior, as is typical of most hydrological models, 
could lead to significant overestimation of the cost-effectiveness of agri-environmental policies 
in reducing nutrient runoff.  
In addition, by accounting for heterogeneity in farmer decision making in quantifying the 
effectiveness of alternative economic-based incentives and policies, our article makes novel 
contributions to integrated assessment modeling for policy analysis. Previous nutrient policy 
evaluation studies may consider both economic costs and environmental outcomes, but are either 
reduced-form in nature (e.g., Sohngen et al. 2015) or assume simplified economic adoption 
outcomes to focus on geophysical or hydrological processes in the watershed (e.g., Laukkanen 
and Nauges 2014; Rabotyagov et al. 2014). A limitation is that, by omitting an explicit farmers’ 
BMP choice model, they are unable to assess the potential impacts of alternative policy 
interventions or account for the potential differences in choice behaviors across heterogeneous 
farmers.  By coupling realistic representation of farmer BMP adoption behavior with a 
hydrological process model and translates individual behavior changes into watershed-scale 
water quality outcomes, we are able to account for heterogeneous responses to hypothetical 
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policy alternatives. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first integrated model of the Lake 
Erie basin that captures these essential features and allows for more realistic policy scenarios. 
Finally, by demonstrating the need and importance of broadening the nutrient 
management policy toolboxes to move beyond existing cost-share programs, the results are 
important for informing water quality policy. None of the single BMP cost-share payment 
programs that we analyzed can achieve the 40% nutrient reduction target even with spatial 
targeting. Instead, we find that a hybrid policy, in which a tax is used to generate the revenues to 
incentivize additional BMP adoption policy, is far more effective than expanding the existing 
cost-share programs—not just because it is revenue neutral, but also because it applies both a 
carrot (cost share payments) and a stick (higher P fertilizer costs) to incentivize farmers.   
 
2. Study Area and Data 
The Maumee River watershed in the western Lake Erie basin is a HUC-6 watershed spanning 
four million acres across three states (northwestern Ohio, northeastern Indiana, and southern 
Michigan) and is the largest source of P loadings into Lake Erie (Scavia et al. 2014) (see Figure 
1). Previous hydrological research shows that 85% of P loadings in this watershed come from 
agricultural fertilizer and manure application on its 10,000 crop farms and 2,000 livestock farms 
(Scavia et al. 2017). As a result, agricultural nutrient management practices in this watershed are 
of significant interest in improving water quality in Lake Erie. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here: Map of the Maumee River watershed] 
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From February to April 2014, we conducted a representative mail survey of 7,500 
farmers in the western Lake Erie basin on their field, farm, and operator characteristics as part of 
a coupled natural-human systems project (Burnett et al. 2015; Martin et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 
2016; Zhang 2015). We also solicited field-specific responses on crop choices, fertilizer 
application, and other BMPs for the 2013 crop year. The addresses of all farmers in the Maumee 
River watershed were provided by a private vendor compiled from lists of farmers receiving 
government payments and from farming magazine subscription rolls. The two-round survey was 
conducted following Dillman’s Tailored Design method (Dillman 2011). The total set of 
mailings included an announcement letter, a survey packet, a reminder letter, and a replacement 
packet for non-responders. Respondents received a $1 bill in the mailings as an incentive to 
increase the response rate. The survey was pilot-tested using farmers recruited by local extension 
professionals several months before the initial mailings. 
A total of 3,234 surveys were initially returned, and of these returned surveys 438 were 
no longer farming and another 32 did not answer the crop management questions. In total, we 
obtained 2,324 valid survey responses, yielding a response rate of 37%. A comparison between 
our data and the Census of Agriculture data for counties in the Maumee River watershed reveals 
that our sample is skewed toward large farms with high gross sales and farmers earning 
additional off-farm income.ii The average farm size is larger than that of the 2012 Census of 
Agriculture for counties in this watershed; however, larger farms have more potential to impact 
the water quality in Lake Erie (Zhang et al 2016). A descriptive report on this survey can be 
found in Burnett et al. (2015). More descriptions on this survey can also be found in Zhang 
(2015) and Zhang et al. (2016).  
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Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the survey, including farmers’ BMP adoption, 
their socio-psychological and demographic characteristics, and farm and field characteristics. In 
this article, we focus on three conservation practices identified by multiple models as critical and 
effective in reducing nutrient runoff from the Maumee River watershed. These practices include 
subsurface fertilizer placement via banding or in-furrow with seed (referred to as subsurface 
placement), post-fall-harvest cover crops (referred to as cover crops), and commercial fertilizer 
application rate reduction (referred to as P rate reduction) (Gildow et al. 2016; Kelley and 
Sweeney 2005; Mahler 2001; Scavia et al. 2014, Scavia et al. 2017). A map of subsurface 
placement adoption based on the survey is presented in Appendix A.   
 
[Insert Table 1 Here: Variable Description and Summary Statistics] 
 
 
We construct our dependent variable for subsurface placement and cover crop adoption—
whether the practice has been adopted already and non-adopters’ self-expressed attitudes towards 
future BMP adoption—using two questions from the survey. Attitudes towards future adoption 
ranges from 0 (will never adopt), to 1 (unlikely to adopt), 2 (likely to adopt), or 3 (will definitely 
adopt). We combine the already adopted farmers into this variable by assigning the adopted 
decisions as 4 (have already adopted). We consider farmers responding 3 or 4 as potentially 
adopting the conservation practice in the next year in the policy simulations, which reduces the 
risk of overestimating the adoption probability of existing adopters. Table 1 shows that 40% and 
18% of farmers have already adopted subsurface placement and cover crops, respectively; and, 
an additional 10% and 5% of producers, respectively, report that they will definitely adopt the 
corresponding practices in the future. Table 1 also shows that on average, farmers in the 
watershed used 100 pounds of P fertilizers on a per acre basis, with higher application rates when 
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growing corn or applying for more than one year. For farmers who at least applied some P in 
2013, their average application rates are around 113 pounds per acre.  
We also include the socio-psychological, socio-economic, and field-level spatial 
characteristics as explanatory variables (Table 1) as established by previous studies (Huang et al. 
2000; Kurkalova et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2016). The social-psychological characteristics include 
perceived efficacy, perception of control, risk attitude, and farmer identity, which quantitatively 
measures farmers’ productivity-oriented versus conservationist inclinations (Arbuckle 2013; 
McGuire et al. 2015). Farmer identity is the difference between conservationist values and 
productionist values, which could range from -4 (greatest identity as productionist) to 4 (greatest 
identity as conservationist). For subsurface placement and cover crops, we have a practice-
specific perceived efficacy measure that represents the farmers’ beliefs in the effectiveness of 
that particular practice at reducing nutrient loss, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great 
extent). This psychological factor has been found to be a major driver of farmers’ adoption 
choices of fertilizer timing (Burnett et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2016), so we expect a higher 
perceived efficacy of a particular conservation practice in reducing soil loss will lead to higher 
adoption rate of P placement or cover crops. Additional socio-psychological measures include 
the farmer’s perceived control over nutrient loss, ranging from 0 (no control) to 6 (complete 
control), and the farmer’s risk attitude measured as the willingness to take risks on a scale from 0 
(not willing to take risks) to 10 (very willing to take risks).  
For socio-economic characteristics, we include the farmer’s age and annual gross income 
for the 2013 production year (farm_income), which ranges from 1 (<$50,000), to 2 ($50,000–
$99,999), 3 ($100,000–$249,999), 4 ($250,000–$499,999), and 5 (>$500,000). For field-level 
characteristics, we include the acreage of the field, soil quality (low, medium, or high), slope 
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(0%–2%, 2%–5%, 5%–10%, >10%, not sure), and whether or not the farm is rented. We also 
calculate a farmer- and practice-specific adoption cost for each practice using farmers’ stated 
expenditures on nutrient inputs, machinery, labor, and farm- or regional-level input prices. 
Appendices A and B show the data and the methodology of how we constructed this variable. 
 
 3. Spatially Integrated Economic-Hydrological Model 
3.1 Model Overview and Policy Scenarios 
We link economic models of farmers’ BMP adoption decisions with a hydrological model to 
predict and evaluate the effects of different nutrient management policies on farmers’ 
management decisions and the resulting downstream P loadings into Lake Erie. In particular, we 
develop three separate field-level farmer decision making models—an ordered logit model of 
future subsurface placement adoption, an ordered logit model of future cover crops adoption, and 
a fertilizer demand model for reduction in fertilizer application rates. We use these models to 
predict changes in the adoption of these practices under each nutrient management policy, and 
then link them to the SWAT model to simulate the downstream water quality improvements as 
measured by the reduction in P loadings. The proceeding sections provide more details on each 
component of this integrated model. 
Using this integrated economic-hydrological model, we analyze the cost-share payments 
for subsurface placement or cover crops. The cost-share payments we examine range from $1 to 
$80 per acre, for which the midpoint is close to the USDA-NRCS Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program payment of $42.99/acre for enhanced nutrient management with deep 
placement. The alternative nutrient management policy scenarios we examine are a fertilizer tax 
and a novel tax/cost-share payment combination policy that imposes fertilizer tax for all farmers 
   
 
13 
and then uses the tax revenue collected to offer cost-share payments for subsurface placement or 
cover crops. We hypothesize that alternative nutrient management policies, such as spatially 
targeted policies or the tax-payment combination policy, could be more cost-effective in 
achieving nutrient reduction goals. 
 
3.2 Economic Models of Farmer Decision-making  
3.2.1 BMP Adoption Model Incorporating Changes in Adoption Costs 
We use an ordered logit model to examine the factors driving the adoption choice of BMPs 
(subsurface placement and cover crops), and then predict the future likelihood of adoption under 
different policy incentive programs. We use the ordered logit model following Zhang et al. 
(2016) because the dependent variable is ordinal and categorical. We estimate the model using 
the “ologit” command via Stata 15 as follows: 
y𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛂𝛂𝒋𝒋 + θ C𝚤𝚤� + 𝛃𝛃 𝐈𝐈𝒊𝒊 + 𝛄𝛄 𝐗𝐗𝒊𝒊 +  ε,     k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4                         Eq. [1] 
where the dependent variable y𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is future adoption decisions of a particular BMP made by 
farmer 𝑖𝑖, which ranges from 0 (will never adopt), to 1 (unlikely to adopt), 2 (likely to adopt), 3 
(will definitely adopt), and 4 (already adopted). The key variable of interest is the predicted 
farmer-specific adoption costs for this particular BMP C𝚤𝚤� , which is measured as the additional 
production costs incurred due to farmer 𝑖𝑖′𝑠𝑠 adoption of this particular BMP. Appendix C shows 
in detail how we calculate this adoption cost measure. In a nutshell, we regress the total field-
level production costs, measured using the expenditures and inputs reported by the farmer 
respondent shown in appendix B, on an already-adopted-BMP dummy and its interaction terms 
with age, field size, and a host of farmer and field characteristics. We use the coefficients for the 
BMP adoption dummy and its interactions to predict the additional production costs induced by 
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the adoption of that particular BMP; and, we then use the predicted values at the individual level 
in equation (1) as C𝚤𝚤� . Other explanatory variables in equation (1) include field characteristics 
𝐗𝐗𝒊𝒊 (e.g., field size, soil quality, slope, and whether or not the field is rented from others) and 
farmers’ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 𝐈𝐈𝒊𝒊 (e.g., perceived efficacy of the BMP, 
mean risk level, identity as a farmer, perceived control over nutrient runoff, age, and gross farm 
income). We include county-level fixed effects 𝛂𝛂𝒋𝒋 and cluster standard errors at the county level 
to control for unobserved spatial heterogeneity and heteroskedastic errors, which effectively 
controls for spatial dependence.  
Under each scenario with a payment subsidy or a tax-payment combination policy, we 
predict a farmer’s likely future adoption probability by summing the predicted probabilities for 
categories 3 (will definitely adopt) and 4 (already adopted) in the ordered logit model using the 
“predict” command via Stata 15. We interpret the probabilities as a set of rules that govern the 
behavior of BMP adoption in the near future and we convert the predicted probability to a binary 
adoption outcome following Lewis and Plantinga (2007). In particular, we draw a random 
number from uniform distribution U [0, 1] and compare the predicted probability of adoption 
with this random number. If the predicted probability is larger than the random number, then we 
assume the farmer will adopt the BMP, otherwise, we assume the farmer will not adopt the BMP. 
We sum the land acres that are predicted to be operated by future adopters and divide it by the 
total acres across all surveyed producers in a given county. This generates the predicted land 
share of each BMP for each policy scenario at a county level. We run the economic model 500 
times and examine the summary statistics for this land share of each county. The county means 
of the 500 runs are very close to what we use in the analysis, and standard deviations are all 
under 0.04 and sample variances are under 0.0012.  Therefore, we are confident that our 
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simulation results are representative. We use this predicted share to integrate these farmer land 
management predictions with the hydrological model, as explained in section 3.2.5.  
In addition to the uniform cost-share payment, we also explore spatially targeted policies 
that only focus on the counties with highest level of nutrient runoff. Based on SWAT analysis, 
we identify the top 20% counties with highest total mass of TP or DRP runoff. With 3 counties 
overlapping on the two lists, we identify nine counties as the runoff “hotspots.”iii 
 
3.2.2 Fertilizer Demand Model 
To evaluate the effects of a fertilizer tax policy on commercial P fertilizer application rates, we 
estimate a fertilizer demand model. This reduced-form model is similar in spirit to the model 
presented at length in Zhang (2015). Our farmer survey is based on farmers’ crop and nutrient 
management choices in 2013. This single-year data may not provide enough variation to reveal 
farmers’ true demand elasticity of P fertilizers—over the past decade, the average U.S. P price 
index ranged from $300/ton to $900/ton. As a result, we added two hypothetical questions to 
induce farmers’ responses under alternative P fertilizer price scenarios. Specifically, we ask “if 
commercial phosphorus fertilizer prices had been $𝑋𝑋/ton, what rate of P would you have applied 
on this field for this most recent crop? ______ lbs/acre,” in which 𝑋𝑋 could be 200, 250, 300, 350, 
450, 500, 550, 750, 800, 850, or 900, thus spanning the recent range of fertilizer price 
movements. With this information, we construct a reduced-form panel data model using P 
application rates under the actual price and two hypothetical price scenarios and identify the 
mean elasticity of P fertilizer demand. Specifically, the panel-data fixed-effects model of 
fertilizer demand is  
                   𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0 +  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0 ∗ 𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖����� +  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           𝑡𝑡 = 1,2,3                              Eq. [2] 
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where 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is individual fixed effects; 𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖����� is the normalized P fertilizer prices adjusted by 
fertilizer types; 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes the fertilizer application rate by farmer 𝑖𝑖 for each crop and 
fertilization frequency choice 𝑙𝑙; 𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0 is the intercept denoting the baseline application rate; and, 𝑡𝑡 
represents the one actual and two hypothetical fertilizer price scenarios.  
Previous research has demonstrated that farmers’ fertilization choices depend on crop, 
crop rotation, and fertilizer application frequency choice (Zhang 2015). As a result, we estimate 
Eq. [2] separately for each of five combinations of crop and P application frequency choices 
(denoted by 𝑙𝑙)—corn and single year application (corn-single, cs), corn and multi-year 
application (corn-multi, cm), soybean and single year application (soybean-single, ss), soybean 
and multi-year application (soybean-multi, sm) and other crop choices (other, o). For each crop 
and fertilization frequency choice 𝑙𝑙, we can estimate the key parameter of interest—the mean 
coefficient for P fertilizer prices (𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0� ). The estimated demand elasticity based on 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0 could be 
interpreted as a “sufficient statistic,” as argued by Chetty (2009), which can be identified using 
reduced-form studies and then used to simulate policy changes and welfare effects for a fertilizer 
tax policy or a policy that couples fertilizer taxes with payments for conservation practices. 
  
3.2.3 Revenue-Neutral Hybrid Policy 
While single policies, be it cost-share payment or fertilizer tax, may not be sufficient to achieve 
the 40% reduction goal, we propose an innovative “revenue neutral” way to link the two types of 
policies to increase effectiveness—using the tax revenue as subsidy for BMP payments. We look 
for the optimal tax that minimizes loading by balancing the tradeoff between reduced fertilizer 
application and reduced revenue for BMP payment when tax is sufficiently high. For simplicity, 
   
 
17 
we only focus on the payment for subsurface placement in our article because it is significantly 
more effective than cover crops.  
Suppose the policymaker’s goal is to minimize the P load to Lake Erie, and the revenue 
neutral policy uses the entire fertilizer tax revenue for cost-share payment. That is: 
min
𝜏𝜏
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥(𝜏𝜏)) + 𝑔𝑔(𝐵𝐵(𝑅𝑅))                                             Eq. [3] 
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡.𝑅𝑅 = 𝜏𝜏𝑥𝑥(𝜏𝜏) 
where L is the total P runoff; x is fertilizer applications on farms in the Maumee River watershed; 
B is the quantity of BMPs applied on farms in the watershed; 𝜏𝜏 is fertilizer tax; and, R is total 
fertilizer tax revenue. Based on our analysis, 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 > 0,𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵 < 0, 𝑥𝑥𝜏𝜏 < 0, and 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅>0. That is, more 
fertilizer application leads to more P runoff, higher BMP adoption leads to lower P runoff, higher 
tax leads to lower fertilizer application, and higher tax revenue means higher total payment to 
BMPs, which leads to higher BMP adoption. To solve the runoff minimization problem, we set 
the first order condition: 
𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝜏𝜏 + 𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝜏𝜏 = 0                                                       Eq. [4] 
and derive the expression 𝑅𝑅𝜏𝜏 = −
𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝜏𝜏
𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅
< 0, which indicates that optimal tax should be set higher 
than the level that would maximize tax revenues. Eq [4] can be restated as   
𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝜏𝜏 + 𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥 + 𝜏𝜏𝑥𝑥𝜏𝜏) = 0                                                Eq. [5] 
which implies that the optimal 𝜏𝜏∗ = − 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥
𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅
− 𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥𝜏𝜏
. The 𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥𝜏𝜏
 term accounts for the offsetting effect of 
a reduction in x on the amount of revenues available for BMP payments. This makes explicit the 
tradeoff that arises in setting the optimal tax to reduce loadings: increases in the tax will reduce 
fertilizer applications, but reductions in x also reduce the total revenues available for BMP 
payments. This also clarifies how the optimal tax depends on the physical system: the greater the 
effectiveness of fertilizer reduction on reduced loadings, 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥, or the greater the effectiveness of the 
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BMP in reducing loadings, 𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵, the higher the optimal tax will be. However, the more responsive 
farmers are in the BMP adoption decisions to payments, the lower the optimal tax. Altogether 
this implies that the optimal tax is determined by a combination of behavioral and physical 
relationships. For some conditions, the optimal tax to reduce nutrient loadings may be a corner 
solution in which farmers demand for fertilizer is driven to zero.   
This approach ignores other private and social costs of fertilizer reduction, including the 
forgone profits that may result from reduced fertilizer use. To account for these, we can reframe 
the problem by defining the optimal tax as the tax that equates the marginal social benefits 
(MSB) and marginal social costs (MSC) of fertilizer use. Suppose the marginal product of 
fertilizer in producing crops is 𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 and the average price of the crop is p. The MSB of fertilizer x 
consists of the marginal private benefit, 𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥, as well as the marginal public benefits of increasing 
x, which are generated through the increase in tax revenues that support the cost-share payments 
for BMPs that reduce ecosystem damages by reducing loadings. Suppose 𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 represents the 
marginal damages of loadings to ecosystem services, then the marginal public benefits of x are 
𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥. The MSC consist of both marginal private cost to the farmer with the fertilizer tax 𝜏𝜏, 
r(1 + 𝜏𝜏) where r is the fertilizer price, and a public cost, which is the ecosystem damages from 
loadings that result from a marginal increase in fertilizer applications, 𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥. Thus MSB=MSC 
implies: 
𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 + 𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥 = 𝑟𝑟(1 + 𝜏𝜏) + 𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥                                                  Eq. [6] 
Given 𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥 = 𝜏𝜏, the optimal tax that maximizes social net benefits is: 𝜏𝜏𝑆𝑆∗ =
𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥−𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥+𝑟𝑟
𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅−𝑟𝑟
.  Assuming 
that the public benefits from reducing nutrient loadings are sufficiently large, so that both the 
numerator and denominator are positive and 𝜏𝜏∗ > 0, then the optimal tax increases with the 
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marginal ecosystem damages of fertilizer, decreases with the marginal effectiveness of BMP 
payments in reducing loadings, and decreases with the value of the marginal product of fertilizer.   
In the empirical analysis, we implement the hybrid policy analyses by using the estimated 
fertilizer price elasticities to calculate the change in fertilizer use for a range of tax rates at the 
county level and sum up total tax revenues across the watershed. We then allocate the revenues 
for each of the tax scenarios as cost-share payments based on the most efficient payment level, 
defined as the one that leads to highest adoption rate (see Appendix D), and assume that it is 
administered in such a way that achieves this best possible outcome. Specifically, using the 
combined results of the farmer decision making and hydrological models, we plot changes in 
loadings as a function of the tax rate and compare the outcomes of tax only policies with the 
revenue neutral hybrid policies in Appendix D. We also show maps of the policy costs and tax 
burden for different counties under these uniform, targeted, or hybrid policies in Appendix E.  
 
3.2.4 Hydrologic Model – Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) Model 
SWAT is a watershed-scale model that has been continuously developed over the past 30 years 
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Agricultural Research Service (ARS) (Arnold et 
al. 1998; Gassman et al. 2007). SWAT incorporates a wide variety of biophysical characteristics 
such as topography, land use/cover, soil, and climate, and is able to facilitate farmer land 
management decisions such as fertilizer, crop, and tile drainage choices, and model changes in 
stream flow and the transport of nutrients (Arnold et al. 1998). Flow and nutrient transport 
processes within the SWAT model are routed at multiple scales. These scales, ranging from the 
smallest to the largest, include Hydrologic Response Unit (HRU), subbasin, and watershed 
levels. Although results can be derived and output from these multiple spatial scales, model 
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processes exclude water, sediment, and nutrient flows across HRUs and instead are aggregated at 
the subbasin level and are routed across subbasins or through the stream phase of the model 
(Malagó et al., 2017). 
The SWAT model has been extensively used to analyze how land use, agricultural 
management practices, and climate change affect water quality in Lake Erie (e.g., Bosch et al. 
2014; Gildow et al. 2016; Michalak et al. 2013; Scavia et al. 2017). However, these biophysical 
studies assume large-scale or random adoption of conservation practices and do not link the 
physical process model with economic behavior assessing actual adoption by farmers, which 
makes it hard to predict the practicality and efficiency of the scenarios.  
Building on Gebremariam et al. (2014), Gildow et al. (2016), and Kalcic et al. (2019), we 
build a spatially-explicit SWAT model calibrated to the western Lake Erie basin to simulate the 
hydrology and nutrient cycling of the Maumee River watershed. In particular, we delineate 358 
sub-basins within the watershed, and further divide them into 24,256 HRUs based on spatial 
features in land use, soils, and topography (Kast 2018). Agricultural practices, including crop 
rotations, fertilizer applications, tillage practices, subsurface drainage, and other BMPs are 
incorporated in the model (at HRU-level) in consultation with the USDA-ARS, the Ohio State 
University Agriculture Extension personnel, and our previously-mentioned farmer survey 
(Burnett et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2016). Key water quality data such as stream flow, TP, and 
DRP, as measured at the Waterville River gaging station, were obtained from the National 
Center for Water Quality Research at Heidelberg University. These data were used to calibrate 
the SWAT model from 2005 to 2010 at a satisfactory level (Moriasi et al. 2007). 
 
3.2.5 Linking Economic Models and SWAT for Policy Simulations  
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For a fertilizer-tax policy, the linkages between the economic farmer decision making models 
and SWAT are simple. Specifically, a fertilizer tax results in higher effective fertilizer prices, 
which translate into predicted reduction in fertilizer application rates. The average predicted 
fertilizer rates at the township level are aggregated to the county level then randomly allocated to 
HRUs to obtain the HRU-average changes in P application rates to simulate changes in P 
loadings. 
For the cost-share payment policies, we rely on the BMP adoption models outlined in 
section 3.2.2 to generate predicted changes in near-term BMP adoption decisions at the field 
level, which are converted to share of adopted acres by pooling across survey respondents at the 
county level. We then downscale the county-level predicted changes in adopted acreage share to 
the 358 sub-basins within the SWAT model, with an average of 4,834 acres per sub-basin. To do 
so, we assume that the predicted county-level land share of a given BMP, calculated as described 
in section 3.3, holds at a smaller spatial sub-basin level. We then randomly assign BMP adoption 
to each HRU within a sub-basin, using the predicted share of land acres as a constraint, so that 
the total share of land allocated to a given BMP corresponds to the predicted share at both sub-
basin and county level. With the newly developed SWAT model, we are able to divide the sub-
basins into finer scale spatial units of 24,256 HRUs, with an average size of 176 acres.  
To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of different policy scenarios, we develop a tradeoff 
frontier that contrasts the policy costs incurred by governments with water quality outcomes 
measured in TP and DRP loading reductions. We assume that the policy costs for the cost-share 
programs are the total outlays of the cost-share payments to farmers, and assume that there are 
no additional program costs given the necessary program structure for administering these 
payments is already in place. In contrast, we assume there is administrative cost from the tax 
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policies. Previous studies on the fertilizer tax policy implementations in Europe show that the 
uniform tax would cost 7%–10% of the tax revenue collected while monitoring a spatially 
differentiated fertilizer tax, assumed to be at the individual parcel or management unit, would 
cost 25%–30% of the tax revenue collected (Lankoski et al. 2010). Given that even our zonal 
policy is still quite aggregate in spatial scale, and therefore not nearly as administratively 
burdensome as a fully spatially differentiated tax, we assume a policy cost of 7% of the total tax 
revenues for the “tax only” policy scenarios and a slightly higher amount, 10%, for the policy 
cost to implement, collect, and recycle the tax under the hybrid revenue-neutral policies. Note 
that because our current economic models do not explicitly model farmers’ profit maximization 
decisions, our policy costs do not include the potential profit impacts induced by these BMP 
adoptions.iv   
 
4. Results and Discussions 
4.1 BMP adoption changes under different policy scenarios 
Based on our analysis as described in 3.2.1, we define our baseline scenario as the predicted 
adoption rate without any policy interventions, which is about 51% adoption of subsurface 
placement and 20% adoption of cover crops (Table 2).  
Following equation (1), we use the field- and farmer-specific adoption cost as an 
explanatory variable to estimate effects of socio-psychological, socio-economic, and field-level 
spatial characteristics on adoption choice. As previously explained, appendix C shows the results 
and procedures of how we calculate field- and farmer-specific adoption costs. Regression results 
from ordered logit models are odds ratios, which we translate to exponentiated coefficient 
estimates for easier understanding in Table 2. Note that although our objective is to understand 
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and predict field-level adoption decisions under different policy interventions rather than causal 
identification, our prediction implicitly relies on the parameters on the adoption costs being 
correctly estimated. A higher adoption cost for subsurface placement or cover crops is 
hypothesized to lead to a lower probability of adopting these practices, which our results 
confirm—a $10 increase in the adoption costs for fertilizer subsurface placement leads to a 24% 
decrease in the likelihood of adopting this practice in the future. Comparatively, a $10 increase 
in field-level adoption cost for cover crops results in a 28% decrease in the future likelihood of 
adopting cover crops. One factor that consistently affects farmers’ adoption decisions is the 
perceived efficacy of their conservation practices in reducing nutrient runoff. Perceived efficacy 
has a large positive impact on adoption decisions—a one unit increase in the perceived efficacy 
indicator almost doubles the likelihood of future adoption—confirming the finding of Zhang et 
al. (2016) and Wilson et al. (2019). We also find field acreage is positively correlated with BMP 
adoption decisions, possibly due to economies of scale. Other field and farmer characteristics do 
not have consistently significant impacts on farmer’s adoption decisions. Farm income has 
opposite impacts on the adoption decision of subsurface placement and cover crops. These 
results could be explained by the intrinsic differences between these two BMPs and emphasize 
the heterogeneity among BMPs as well as farmers and fields, which is consistent with Zhang et 
al. (2016).  
 
[Insert Table 2 Here: Ordered Logit Model Estimates of Subsurface Placement and Cover Crops 
Adoption] 
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We aggregate the predicted adoption land share at county level for each payment scenario 
and present the average adoption rates (Figure 2a) measured in percentage of acres (adoption rate 
is the total acreage of adopted crop land divided by the total acreage of crop land). We see that 
with a $20/acre to $80/acre payment, the adoption rate of subsurface placement can increase 
from 46% to 65%.v For cover crops, the adoption rate can increase from 20% to 63% of all 
cropland acres in the watershed.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 Here: Increases in BMP adoptions under different nutrient management policy 
scenarios] 
 
We also explore how fertilizer tax influences farmers’ fertilizer amount decisions and 
report the results for the reduced-form panel data analysis equation (2) in Table 3. This model is 
estimated separately for each crop and fertilization frequency choice. The mean estimated 
elasticity of P fertilizer demand is derived from the coefficient for p_price _norm, which is the 
estimated 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0�  in equation (2), while holding all other variables constant at means. On average, 
the estimated elasticity of P fertilizer demand ranges from -0.264 to -0.488. For example, there is 
a 2.64% reduction in P fertilizer rate given a 10% fertilizer price increase for corn fields with 
single-year fertilization. These estimates are similar to previous estimates of elasticity of 
fertilizer demand (Griliches 1958; Pitt 1983), which ranges from -0.20 to -0.95. A comparison of 
the elasticities across different fertilization frequency choices reveals that fields with multi-year 
fertilization application have a significantly higher elasticity of P demand than fields with single-
year application. This makes sense because farmers are more likely to use greater application 
rates with multi-year applications and could make flexible changes facing input price shocks. To 
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evaluate the stability of our elasticity estimate, panel (II) only uses responses from these two 
hypothetical fertilizer application rate questions and assesses the effects of potential 
“hypothetical bias” on the estimated coefficient in P fertilizer prices. The implied elasticities are 
very similar to the main specification, except for corn with multi-year applications, which is also 
within the range of previous estimates from the literature. 
 
[Insert Table 3 Here: Estimated elasticity of phosphorus fertilizer demand from reduced-form 
panel regressions] 
 
4.2 P loadings under different policy scenarios through Linkage with SWAT Model 
To link the predicted adoption rate under each policy scenario with SWAT, we randomly 
allocate the adoption rate within each county across 24,256 HRUs while maintaining the 
predicted adoption rate at the targeted level for each sub-basin. HRUs are the smallest spatial 
units at which hydrologists can identify nutrient flow in the SWAT model. Simulations generate 
monthly TP and DRP runoff from 2005 to 2015 (with 2000 to 2004 as the validation period) and 
we calculate the yearly spring (March to July) load to match the 2012 GLWQA targetvi. Figure 2 
shows the average spring load change under each policy.  
In Figure 3a we show the percentage reduction in spring TP and DRP loadings under 
uniform or targeted cost-share payments for subsurface placement. With uniform payments 
ranging from $20 to $80 per acre, a gain in adoption rate for subsurface placement from 46% to 
65% results in load reductions of 8% in TP and 13% in DRP. The figure shows that the same 
level of total cost-share payment budget can achieve a much higher P reduction when targeting 
the runoff hotspots counties, which also enables higher payments. Figure 3b shows uniform 
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payments but for cover crops where we see negligible P reductions of less than 1%. A number of 
factors could be responsible for the negligible impact of cover crops on phosphorus reductions, 
including model specification of the timing between removing cover crops and planting the next 
crop in rotation. In the SWAT model, the time between the removal of cover crops and the 
planting of corn was 22 days. During this time the soil is bare and without cover, which could 
lead to more nutrient discharge than if the soil was covered (Zhang et al., 2011).  Some previous 
literature is consistent with the negligible effect of cover crops on phosphorus reductions (e.g. 
King et al. in prep), while other studies have found much larger effects on reducing phosphorus 
losses from increased cover crop adoption (Duncan et al., 2019; Singh et al., 2018; Iowa Nutrient 
Reduction Strategy 2017; Heathwaite et al., 2000; Sharpley and Smith, 1991).vii  
In Figures 3c and 3d we show respectively the percentage reduction for various levels of 
a fertilizer tax and the revenue-neutral hybrid policy in which the revenues from the fertilizer tax 
are used as BMP payments. The results clearly demonstrate that the hybrid policy is more 
effective than either a standalone fertilizer tax or cost-share policy. For example, at a 200% 
(400%) tax rate, we find that the reduction in TP and DRP is 22.5% (40%) and 29% (51%) 
respectively for the tax-only scenarios and 40.5% (54%) and 53% (69%) for the hybrid policy 
scenarios. By comparison, if taxpayer dollars were used to generate the same amount of funds 
for cost-share payments for subsurface placement as is generated by a 200% fertilizer tax, then 
this would correspond to a $170 per acre uniform payment with estimated adoption rates of 72% 
and load reductions of 18% in TP and 24% in DRP. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 Here: Reduction in total and DRP loadings under different nutrient management 
policy scenarios] 
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4.3 Tradeoff frontier analysis of different nutrient management policies 
We establish the policy tradeoff frontier by contrasting the predicted DRP and TP reduction rate 
with the cost of each policy incurred by governments to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of each 
policy (Figure 4). As explained in section 3.2.5, we calculate only the direct government outlays 
as the policy costs. Therefore, the total cost-share payments are the policy costs for the voluntary 
BMP adoption programs. Recall we assume that the policy costs for the fertilizer tax and hybrid 
tax/cost-share policies are 7 and 10% of the tax revenue, respectively. Figure 4 clearly 
demonstrates that the revenue-neutral combination policy of allocating tax revenue as payment 
for subsurface placement is the most cost-effective policy. Not surprisingly, because this is a 
revenue-neutral policy, it dominates any cost share payment program that imposes the policy 
cost on taxpayers. Because it not only raises the cost of pollution, but also increases BMP 
adoption by providing cost-share payments, the hybrid policy generates additional water quality 
gains relative to the fertilizer tax scenarios in which revenues are not redistributed in this way.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 Here: Tradeoff frontier of DRP loading reductions versus policy costs under 
different nutrient management policies]  
 
5. Conclusions 
HABs and hypoxia in freshwater and marine ecosystems are a growing global concern. In the 
United States, HABs in Lake Erie have worsened since the 1990s—the five worst blooms on 
record all occurred since 2011 (Wilson et al. 2019). The size of the hypoxic zone in the Gulf of 
Mexico is not smaller despite decades of nutrient reduction efforts. Previous research has 
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decidedly linked agricultural nutrient runoffs with these downstream water quality problems. Our 
article focuses on the cost-effectiveness of various nutrient management policies in reducing 
nutrient runoff by developing a spatially integrated economic-hydrological model of the western 
Lake Erie basin. Our integrated model combines economic analysis of micro-level farmer 
adoption behavior of three key BMPs—subsurface placement, cover crops, and reduced P 
fertilizer applications—with a hydrological model, which allows us to quantify changes in 
individual BMP adoptions and watershed-scale P loadings. Our results show that subsurface 
placements and P application rate reductions are more cost-effective than cover crops, and that a 
hybrid revenue-neutral policy, which applies fertilizer tax revenue as a cost-share payment for 
subsurface placement, is a far more cost-effective approach in achieving the desired 
improvements in water quality. We also find that, despite substantial increases in the adoption of 
single BMPs with increases in cost-share payments, the reductions in P are far below the 40% 
reduction goal. In contrast, the tax or hybrid policies can achieve the policy target and in a much 
more cost-effective manner. For example, a 400% fertilizer tax could lead to 39.5% reduction in 
TP, while a hybrid policy in which a 200% fertilizer tax is applied and recycled for cost-share 
payments for subsurface placement can lead to 40.5% reduction in TP.  
Our findings have important implications for the design of nutrient management policies 
and integrated assessment models of nutrient runoff and water quality. In particular, our results 
show that by ignoring biophysical complexities, such as legacy P in the soils captured through 
biophysical process models such as SWAT, economic adoption models alone could significantly 
overestimate the effectiveness of these policies in reducing nutrient runoffs. We also demonstrate 
the importance of broadening the policy toolbox and moving beyond the prevalent cost-share 
payments to consider more cost-effective policy instruments such as a hybrid fertilizer tax/cost-
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share payments program. This revenue-neutral combination policy not only induces fertilizer rate 
reductions, but also generates revenues that can be used for cost-share payment programs. 
Despite still being second best,viii this makes it more cost-effective compared to the cost-share 
payment programs. Even the spatially targeted zonal policies, while more cost-effective than 
uniform payments, are far less cost-effective than the hybrid policies.   
Our article represents a step toward better understanding the complex coupled human-
natural systems of agricultural pollution and water quality and ecosystem services; however, it 
has several key limitations. First, we do not conduct a complete cost-benefit analysis, which 
would account for additional private and public benefits and costs, including potential foregone 
profits from reduced fertilizer applications that may result in lower yields and the corresponding 
increases in ecosystem service benefits from water quality improvements in Lake Erie. Future 
research is needed to incorporate benefits, such as Lake Erie recreational anglers’ willingness to 
pay (Zhang and Sohngen 2018), by combining them with lake ecological models and non-market 
valuation. Such studies could fully examine the tradeoff between fertilizer reduction and 
reduction in cost-share payments when tax is sufficiently high. Second, in terms of spatially 
targeted policies, we only explore the zonal policies that target runoff hotspot counties, but not at 
an individual field level, which would be necessary to establish the first-best policy benchmark. 
Third, future research needs to evaluate how to mitigate the potential bias resulting from the 
spatial and temporal mismatch when the predicted annual adoption behaviors are aggregated to 
the county level and the biophysical models generate daily or monthly water quality simulations 
at a much finer scale.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
Variable Description # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max  
Farmer choice 
Adopt_place The attitude of adopting subsurface 
placement (0 “will never adopt,” 1 
“unlikely to adopt,” 2 “likely to adopt,” 3 
“will definitely adopt,” and to 4 “have 
already adopted”) 
2134 2.65 1.25 0  4 
Adopt_cover The attitude of adopting cover crops (0 
“will never adopt,” 1 “unlikely to adopt,” 2 
“likely to adopt,” 3 “will definitely adopt,” 
and 4 “have already adopted”) 
2142 1.96 1.13 0  4 
P_rate P fertilizer rate (lbs/acre of P2O5 applied in 
2013)  
1488 100.07 252.84 0 300 
P_price_actual Actual P fertilizer price ($/ton) 1489 576.20 107.24 375 800 
P_price_hypothetical Hypothetical P fertilizer price ($/ton) 1489 367.60 157.17 200 950 
  
Socio-psychological characteristics 
Efficacy_placement                       Perceived effectiveness of adopting subsur
face placement at reducing nutrients (0 “n
ot at all” to 4 “to a great extent”) 
2189 2.59 0.97 0  4 
Efficacy_cover Perceived effectiveness of adopting cover 
crops at reducing nutrients (0 “not at all” t
o 4 “to a great extent”) 
2197 2.56 1.01 0  4 
Perception_control                                Farmers’ perception of  
control over the farm (0 “no control” to 6 
“complete control”) 
2189 3.49 1.02 0  6  
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Risk_mean Risk attitude in general (0 “not willing to t
ake risks” to 10 “very willing to take risk
s”)  
2198 5.17 2.09 0  10 
Farmer_identity       Farmer identity (ranges from -4 “greatest   
identity as productionist” to 4 “greatest ide
ntity as conservationist”)  
2185 1.29 0.84 -1.26  4 
  
Socio-economic characteristics 
Age                     Age (years) 2227 58.16 11.87 17   85 
Farm_income  annual gross farm 
income (2013 dollars) (1 “<$50,000,” 2 
“$50,000–99,999,” 3 “100,000–$249,99
9,” 4 “250,000–499,999,” 5 “>500,000”) 
2039 3.05 1.33 1 5  
  
Field-level characteristics 
field_acre                       Acreage of the field 2227 51.65 49.13 5 650 
Soil_quality                         Soil quality of the field (1 “low,” 2 “mediu
m,” 3 “high”) 
2227 2.02 .82 1  3  
Slope Slope of the field (1 “0%–2%,” 2 “2%–
5%,” 3 “5%–10%,” 4 “>10%,” 5 “not sur
e”) 
2197 2.13 1.43 1  5  
field_rent     Binary, =1 if field is rented 2204 .36 .48 0  1  
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Table 2. Ordered Logit Model Estimates of Subsurface Placement and Cover Crops Adoptions  
Variables Adopt subsurface placement Adopt cover crops 
Psychological-demographic characteristics 
Perceived_efficacy_of_subsurface_placement      0.7103***  
 (0.061)  
Perceived_efficacy_of_cover_crops  0.8700*** 
  (0.057) 
Perception_control 0.0536 0.0552 
 (0.056) (0.051) 
Risk_mean 0.0168 0.0294 
 (0.027) (0.025) 
Farmer_identiy -0.0182 0.1631*** 
 (0.066) (0.062) 
Socio-economic characteristics 
Age 0.0001* -0.0110** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Farm_income -0.0832*** 0.1064*** 
 (0.045) (0.041) 
Field-level spatial characteristics 
Subsurface_placement_cost -0.2416***  
 (0.015)  
Cover_crops_cost  -0.2835*** 
  (0.021) 
Field_acre 0.0031*** 0.0021** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Soil_quality 0.0907 0.0282 
 (0.067) (0.060) 
Slope -0.0407 -0.0260 
 (0.039) (0.036) 
Field_rent 0.0718 0.0069 
 (0.117) (0.108) 
   
Fixed effect  County level County level 
Observations 1,796 1,801 
Average baseline adoption rate – Maumee 51.1% 19.7% 
Average baseline adoption rate – IN 46.1% 14.0% 
Average baseline adoption rate – MI 52.2% 24.7% 
Average baseline adoption rate – OH  52.6% 20.9% 
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Table 3. Estimated Elasticity of Phosphorus (P) Fertilizer Demand from Reduced-Form Panel 
Regressions  
  
  corn  
single 
corn  
multi 
soybean 
single 
soybean 
multi   
Linear panel fixed effects model 
Actual and hypothetical  -0.4376* -0.5634*** -0.4104*** -0.8462*** 
P price (0.2259) (0.1689) (0.1111) (0.2325) 
Intercept 115.89*** 112.47*** 109.52*** 148.71*** 
 (12.77) (9.43) (6.186) (13.39) 
Number of observations 1752 1097 603 405 
Implied mean elasticity -0.2714* -0.388*** -0.2638*** -0.4876*** 
     
Linear panel fixed effects model – Hypothetical questions only 
Hypothetical -0.4682*** -0.3616*** -0.3561*** -0.8307*** 
P price (0.1554) (0.1063) (0.1012) (0.2620) 
Intercept 124.65*** 100.82*** 112.63*** 155.93 
 (8.71) (5.84) (5.559) (14.990) 
Number of observations 1168 731 402 270 
Implied mean elasticity -0.2665*** -0.2456*** -0.2101*** -0.4383*** 
     
Average actual P application rate 
(lbs/ac) 
106.22 123.95 109.35 112.03 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Map of the Maumee River watershed highlighting the per-acre phosphorus loading across 
subbasins.  
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Figure 2. Increases in BMP adoptions under different nutrient management policy scenarios. 
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Figure 3. Reduction in total and DRP loadings under different nutrient management policy 
scenarios. 
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Figure 4. Tradeoff frontier of TP and DRP loading reductions versus policy costs under different nutrient management policies. 
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Grouped Endnotes 
i Based on results from previous literature, we assume that policy costs are a function of program 
size. Specifically the costs of implementing the fertilizer tax are set at 7% of the total tax 
revenues generated ($14 million in the case of a 400% tax) and 10% for implementing the hybrid 
policy ($17 million in the case of a 200% tax). The latter is due to the added coordination that is 
necessary for redistributing the cost-share payments.  
ii While this may suggest that our sample is not statistically representative of all 18,116 farms in 
the Maumee River watershed, the 2012 Census of Agriculture data also shows that over 80% of 
all cropland in Ohio and Indiana are located on farms with at least 180 acres and over half of the 
acreage is on farms with at least 500 acres (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2014). As larger 
farms manage a greater relative proportion of cultivated lands in the Corn Belt, they also have a 
disproportionate potential to impact environmental quality through adoption or non-adoption of 
conservation practices. In fact, in the western Lake Erie basin, almost 65% of the cropland is 
managed by farmers with operations of at least 500 acres, while those with operations under 50 
acres manage less than 3% of the total acreage (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2014). Since the 
focus of our article is farmers’ water-quality-related management choices, it seems appropriate to 
focus on the larger farms, or the farmers who manage proportionally more acreage in the 
watershed, which is more important from both a behavioral and a water quality control 
perspective (Zhang et al. 2016). 
iii Adams (IN), De Kalb (IN), Fulton (OH), Henry (OH), Hillsdale (MI), Paulding (OH), Putnam 
(OH), Van Wert (OH), and Williams (OH). 
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iv Please see Zhang (2015) for an example for a more comprehensive analysis of the policy costs 
for uniform and spatially targeted fertilizer tax policies, including changes in farmers’ 
profitability.  
v Policy baselines are different from the survey baselines because of uncertainties in future 
adoption decisions. 
vi 2000-2004 period was used as both the model validation period as well as the model “spin up” 
time. We ran SWAT models from 2000 to 2015 but skip reporting results for the first five years 
of this period. We also used the period 2000-2004 in the validation process to calibrate the 
model. 
vii Although not a focus of this paper, the SWAT model showed cover crops had a greater impact 
on nitrogen losses (3% as adoption rate increased from 20% to 63%) than phosphorus losses 
(<1%). However, these losses are below levels found in other studies (Ruffatti et al., 2019; 
Thapa et al., 2018).The factors described above could also contribute to the muted effectiveness 
of cover crops on nitrogen loss reductions in this SWAT model. 
viii Although first-best policies can be efficient in theory, in reality they can be prohibitively 
expensive to implement (Lankoski et al. 2010) and most policies are second-best because of their 
uniform payments, transaction costs, information rent, or uncoordinated correction of policies 
(Claassen and Horan 2000; Larson, Helfand, and House 1996; Peterson et al. 2014; Weinberg 
and Kling 1996). 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Figure A. Map of subsurface placement adoption based on the survey 
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Appendix B. Sample questions from the farmer survey regarding management costs 
• What plant population did you plant on this field for this most recent crop? 
Quantity: _______________ seeds/acre 
Price: _________ $/10,000 seeds 
 
• Did you apply manure on this field for this most recent crop? 
  No 
  Yes →source of manure (check all that apply) 
      Dairy     Swine     Poultry 
Quantity: ________ lbs/acre 
Price: ________ $/lb 
 
• Considering all fertilizers on this field for this most recent crop, how much phosphorus and 
nitrogen was applied and what was the price you paid? (Please write ‘0’ if none was applied) 
       Phosphorus      Nitrogen 
Rate (lbs/acre):      ________       ________ 
Price ($/ton):        ________       ________ 
Form (P):     MAP      DAP      APP          
Form (N):     Urea       UAN      NH3 
 
• How much in total did you spend on herbicide, insecticide, and fungicide for this field last 
year? Please select the costs per acre that best approximate your situation with this field. 
         $10    $15   $20    $30   
   $40    $50   $60    $80 
 
• Is this field covered by any Federal Crop Insurance program? 
        No   Yes  
 
• Do you rent this field? 
  No 
  Yes→ Who is primarily responsible for nutrient management decisions? (Check one) 
   Me alone 
  Primarily me, with landlord input 
  Equally me and my landlord 
  Primarily my landlord, with my input 
  My landlord alone 
  Other_____________________ 
          →What is your rental agreement with your landlord? (Check all that apply) 
  Rent for cash  
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  Rent for a share of crop 
 
• Tell us more about the machinery and equipment you used on this field last year: 
Horsepower of your largest tractor_______ 
 Horsepower of combine harvester _______ 
        Number of rows in planter ________ 
 
For more details, please refer to the descriptive report about the survey on this project website: 
http://ohioseagrant.osu.edu/archive/maumeebay/project/resources/ (Burnett et al. 2015).  
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Appendix C. Construction and prediction of field-level BMP adoption costs 
C.1 Construction of Field-level Production Cost 
We calculate the total costs of managing the farm for each respondent based on their specific 
responses in the survey. In particular, each farmer was asked to allocate all their fields into high-, 
medium-, and low-productivity categories based on corn and soybean yield ranges and pick one 
field from a randomly selected quality class (e.g., pick one field among all high-productivity 
fields that they operate). For each chosen field, the farmer provided various field-specific 
expenditures that we used to construct the field-level production cost (see Appendix A for 
sample questions on these expenditures). These responses include field-specific seeding rate and 
seeding cost, manure quantity, type, and unit price, fertilizer application quantity, type, and unit 
price, per-acre expenditures on herbicide and federal crop insurance program, as well as whether 
the fields are cash rented from other farmers. The respondents also provided agricultural 
production details on corn drying, machinery usage and repairs, fuel usage, and labor and 
management conditions, which were converted into dollar-based expenditures using the 
statewide custom rates and standard production costs based on the 2012 Ohio State University 
Production Cost and Custom Rate Survey (Ward 2012).  
 
C.2 Predicting Field-level Adoption Cost of Conversation Practice 
Field-level adoption cost of specific conservation practices is one unique explanatory variable. 
For each practice—fertilizer subsurface placement or cover crops—we run a separate OLS 
regression of the field-level total production cost on field-level physical characteristics (e.g., 
field size, soil quality, rent status), management practice decisions (e.g., BMP adoption), and 
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field operator’s demographic characteristics (e.g., age). This regression allows us to separate the 
adoption cost for each conservation practice from its total production cost at the field level and 
allow for heterogeneity in this cost across fields and operators. We include two interaction terms 
between this adoption dummy—one operator demographic characteristic (age) and one field-
level characteristic—proxied by field size. Previous literature has demonstrated that adoption 
cost will vary by both operator and field characteristics (Traoré, Landry, and Amara 1998; 
Prokopy et al. 2008). We use the age of the operator and field size as two proxies for this 
heterogeneity. We represent the field size in both acreage and acreage bins and find robust 
results.i In particular, we estimate two regressions for phosphorus fertilizer subsurface placement 
and cover crop adoption separately:  
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 
= 𝛼𝛼 ∗ Xfield +  β ∗ Xoperator + 𝛾𝛾1 ∗ already adopted subsurface placement +  𝛾𝛾2
∗ already adopted subsurface placement ∗ age + 𝛾𝛾3 ∗ already adopted subsurface placement
∗ acreage + 𝛾𝛾4 ∗ adopted any BMP other than subsurface placement
+ ε                                      Eq. [C1] 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 
= 𝜁𝜁 ∗ Xfield +  η ∗ Xoperator + 𝜃𝜃1 ∗ already adopted cover crops +  𝜃𝜃2
∗ already adopted cover crops ∗ age + 𝜃𝜃3 ∗ already adopted covercrops ∗ acreage + 𝜃𝜃4
∗ adopted any BMP other than cover crops + ε                                            Eq. [C2] 
where Xfield includes field size, soil quality, whether the field is rented (0/1), and whether the 
field has adopted any BMP other than subsurface placement (0/1); and, Xoperator includes the age 
of the farmer. In particular, as explained earlier, we included a binary variable “already adopted,” 
which equals one when the farmer has already adopted the BMP of interest on this specific field. 
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We also control for the adoption of BMPs other than the one of interest including grid soil 
sampling with variable rate, delaying broadcasting when the forecast predicts a 50% or more 
chance of at least one inch of total rainfall in the next 12 hours, managing field water levels with 
drainage management systems, avoiding winter or frozen ground surface application of 
phosphorus, avoiding fall application of phosphorus, determining rates based on regular soil 
testing once within the rotation (or every three years), following soil test trends to maintain the 
agronomic range for phosphorus in the soil (15 to 30 ppm), and requiring a 4R certification 
program for private applicators. 
               In practice, the adoption dummy variable and these two interaction variables allow us 
to derive field-specific adoption costs after estimating these two aforementioned regressions: 
Field level predicted adoption cost for field i for subsurface placement = γ1
� ∗
 already adopted subsurface placement +  γ2
� ∗  already adopted subsurface placement ∗  age_i +
γ3
� ∗  already adopted subsurface placement ∗  field size_i                                                      Eq. [C3]                                                                                                                
 
Field level predicted adoption cost for field i for cover crops =  θ1
� ∗
 already adopted cover crops +  θ2
� ∗  already adopted cover crops ∗  agei + θ3
� ∗
 already adopted cover crops ∗  field sizei                                                                                       Eq. [C4]          
where 𝛾𝛾0� , 𝛾𝛾1� , 𝛾𝛾2� , 𝛾𝛾3� ,𝜃𝜃0�,𝜃𝜃1�,  𝜃𝜃2� ,𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 𝜃𝜃3� are coefficients estimated from Eq. [C1] and Eq. [C2]. 
                These regressions naturally suggest that in our study, the adoption costs for BMPs vary 
not only by the intrinsic features of BMP adoption (𝛾𝛾0� , 𝛾𝛾1� ,𝜃𝜃0�, and 𝜃𝜃1� ), but also vary across 
different fields and farmers due to heterogeneous age/experience and spatially-varying field 
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characteristics. We expect 𝛾𝛾1� 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 𝜃𝜃1� to be postitive, representing an increase in production cost 
in general due to BMP adoption, but 𝛾𝛾2�  and 𝜃𝜃2� to be negative meaning that more experienced 
operators could adopt these practices in a marginally more cost-effective manner. 𝛾𝛾3�  and 𝜃𝜃3� can 
be positive or negative depending on the particular BMP because some larger fields have lower 
per acre costs due to economies of scale, while some other larger fields require different 
technology or crops that potentially increase per acre costs.   
 
C.3 Predicting Field-level Adoption Cost of Conversation Practice 
We estimate Eq. [C1] to predict field-level adoption costs of subsurface placement. Table B.1 
shows that on average the cost of adopting any BMP other than subsurface placement is $24 per 
acre. Larger farms and better soil quality induce higher production cost, which may be 
interpreted as higher investment on the farm. Rented land also incurs higher associated costs. 
Our approach allows us to dissect the farm-specific adoption cost of BMP based on farmer 
demographic characteristics (represented by farmer’s age) and farm-level physical characteristics 
(represented by field size). As predicted, we find 𝛾𝛾1�  to be positive, showing there is additional 
cost of adopting subsurface placement. 𝛾𝛾2�  𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 𝛾𝛾3�  are both negative, indicating that farmer 
experience and economy of scale reduces the per acre adoption cost. For those who adopted 
subsurface placement, the adoption cost decreases by $1 per acre (𝛾𝛾2� ) with a one-year increase in 
farmer’s age; and, a one-acre increase in field size decreases the adoption costs by about $.28 
(𝛾𝛾3� ). Based on these estimates, we uncover the field- and farmer-specific subsurface placement 
adoption cost following Eq. [C3]: 
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𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 
= 102.3464 − 1.0503 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 − 0.2828 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹                       𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸. [𝐶𝐶5]       
            We set the lower bound of adoption cost at zero and replace those below zero with zero 
because it is unrealistic to assume a negative adoption cost, which accounts for less than the 
lowest 5% tail of the distribution. The average estimated per acre subsurface placement adoption 
cost is $24.32 based on average farmer characteristics and field-level characteristics, which is in 
line with BMP adoption cost, and different federal or state cost-share programs. Generally, 
subsurface placement is $12–$15 more per acre than broadcast phosphorus application, where 
broadcasting costs $4.10–$15.20 per acre depending on the fertilizer type. For non-adopters, we 
assume their costs are higher and use the 75th percentile ($100.07/acre) of the adoption cost 
distribution as the proxy.  
Table C.1. Subsurface Placement Adoption Cost Estimates 
Variable                   Total cost 
Field acreage Field acreage bins 
Other_BMP 23.7767*** 25.6974*** 
 (7.228) (7.253) 
Field_acre   0.2821***  
 (0.058)  
Field_size_bin_dummy  32.3665** 
  (12.677) 
Age -0.2244 -0.2329 
 (0.212) (0.213) 
Soil_quality 27.6678*** 28.4730*** 
 (3.446) (3.460) 
Field_rent 14.1109** 14.4501** 
 (6.013) (6.039) 
Already_placement(𝛾𝛾0� ) 102.3464*** 127.7725*** 
 (26.584) (33.620) 
Already_placement*age (𝛾𝛾1� ) -1.0503** -1.0638** 
 (0.440) (0.442) 
Already_placement*field acreage(𝛾𝛾2� ) -0.2828***  
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 (0.058)  
Already_placement* Field_size_bin_dummy (𝛾𝛾2� )  -37.0227* 
  (20.424) 
Constant 242.5131*** 218.3774*** 
 (62.212) (64.200) 
Fixed effect County level County level 
Observations 2,324 2,324 
 
           The results for cover crops resemble that for subsurface placement (Table B.2), and 
similarly, wee uncover the field- and farmer-specific cover crop adoption cost following Eq. 
[C4]: 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 38.8825 − 1.0555 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 + 0.2957 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹         𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸. [𝐶𝐶6]        
           As expected, we find 𝜃𝜃1� to be positive, showing the additional cost of adopting cover 
crops. We find 𝜃𝜃2� to be negative, indicating one year of experience reduces the adoption costs by 
about $1. Here we find adoption cost increases with field size, which could be explained by the 
different types of cover crops or different technology chosen due to the field size. Using these 
proxies, we find that the average per acre adoption cost for cover crops is $31.70, which is in the 
range of USDA-NRCS payments ($28.71/acre to $34.76/acre).ii Again, for non-adopters, we 
assume their costs are higher and use the 75th percentile ($36.60/acre) as a proxy for their 
adoption costs.  
Table C.2. Cover Crops Adoption Cost Estimates 
Variable                   Total cost 
Farm acreage Farm acreage bins 
Other_BMP 38.3383*** 38.4771*** 
 () (6.87) 
Field_acre   -0.0007  
 (.002)  
Field_size_bin_dummy  21.3790* 
  -11.072 
Age -0.3167 -0.3396* 
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 (0.198) (0.198) 
Soil_quality 27.5982*** 27.9594*** 
 (3.488) (3.486) 
Field_rent 13.6962** 13.7392** 
 (6.077) (6.083) 
Already_cover_crop(𝜃𝜃0�) 38.8825 73.2262 
 (36.938) (44.877) 
Already_cover_crop*age (𝜃𝜃1�) -1.0555* -1.1383* 
 -0.614 -0.613 
Already_cover_crop*acreage(𝜃𝜃2�) 0.2957**  
 -0.13  
Already_cover_crop* Field_size_bin_dummy -14.4433 
  -44.877 
Constant 272.0461*** 246.7916*** 
 -61.978 -63.363 
Fixed effect County level County level 
Observations 2,324 2,324 
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Appendix D. Combinations of tax and cost-share payments 
Table D. Combinations of tax and cost-share payments 
Tax (%) 
Total revenue 
(million dollars) 
Matching payment for 
subsurface placement 
($/acre) 
20 22.30 10 
40 43.42 20 
60 63.35 30 
80 82.10 40 
100 99.66 45 
200 173.57 170 
300 218.00 200 
400 234.21 210 
 
For each level of tax revenue, we find the most efficient way of using it as cost-share payment, 
i.e. the level that leads to highest adoption rate. For example, the 20% fertilizer tax will collect 
$22.3 million dollars, if used for payment for subsurface placement, it can pay $10/acre which 
leads to 50.25% of adoption. Note that this adoption rate is lower than current adoption rate 
without policy intervention, which is because we use the Lewis and Plantinga (2007) method 
take into account of the uncertainty in future adoption, even for current adopters. Similarly, if 
budget is used for cover crops payment, it can pay $25/acre which leads to about 30.65% of 
adoption. Note that the current adoption rate is lower for cover crops, which requires higher 
payment to increase.  
In Figure D, we plot the percent changes in loadings as a function of the fertilizer tax 
across a wide range of tax rates to investigate the tax rate that minimizes loadings in both the tax-
only and hybrid policy cases, according to Equation [4] and as described in section 3.2.3, which 
forces us to consider unrealistic levels of a fertilizer tax. We find that total tax revenues are 
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maximized at about an 800% tax, and that the tax rate at which loadings are minimized in both 
the tax-only and hybrid tax scenarios is closer to 1000% percent. At a 1000% tax, the model 
predicts that the average fertilizer application is driven to 0, which makes this tax a “choke 
price.” The result is a corner solution: the effectiveness of reduced fertilizer application in 
reducing loadings dominates the effectiveness of either BMP in reducing loadings, and therefore 
the most effective approach to reducing loadings is simply to reduce fertilizer application.  
Clearly these are highly unrealistic scenarios, and we include them only for illustrative 
purposes to examine the relative differences in the policies and the potential trade-off in loading 
reductions from the hybrid policy. As explained in section 3.2.3, this approach omits a broader 
consideration of cost and benefits, included the foregone profits from massive increases in 
fertilizer costs that drive application rates to zero. The optimal tax would account for these 
forgone profits while also considering the social benefits of reduced loadings in terms of 
improved ecosystem services. Both effects are likely to be substantial, and thus a full analysis of 
the optimal tax policy is important, but beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Figure D. Comparison of TP and DRP reduction of tax policies    
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Appendix E.  
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Figure E. Policy costs and tax burden for: (a) $40/acre uniform payment, (b) $80/acre spatially 
targeted payment, (c) 200% tax+payment hybrid policy.   
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Grouped Endnotes 
i 150 acres each bin 
ii https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb1082778.pdf  
                                                 
